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1 Introduction
Technology adoption has become one of the principal research topics in
growth theory in the recent years. The considerable weight of adoption costs
(twenty times higher than those for innovation, see for example Jovanovic,
1997) has directed interest in the profession towards the study of problems of
diffusion and adoption of new technologies. The recent boom of the informa-
tion technologies and the associated employment and growth opportunities
has made the latter study even more urgent from the economic policy point
of view.1
Technology adoption is costly in that it requires some specific vintage phys-
ical and human capital (see the survey of Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1998)
and involves learning costs. Indeed technological upgrading implies the de-
preciation of the pre-existing specific human capital (Parente, 1994) and a
slow learning process during which the economy is unable to run the new
technology at its best productivity level. In order to avoid this phase, an
economy would need to gather engineers and scientists with some specific
skills, which is hardly feasible, so that technology adoption could even lead
to a productivity slowdown (Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997). A slightly
different mechanism is put forward by Galor and Tsiddon (1997) (see also
Galor and Moav, 2000). A technological acceleration induces an erosion ef-
fect on the level of human capital of each individual. Though the acceleration
does allow the individuals to operate at a higher productivity (the so-called
productivity effect), the erosion effect is predominant in the short run, giv-
ing rise to a productivity slowdown. The latter considerations are specially
true if technological progress is embodied in the new capital goods, as the
technological advances conveyed by the information technologies are. Since
embodiment is both qualitatively and quantitatively one of the most relevant
features of growth specially since the seventies (see Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Krusell, 1997), the adoption problem is increasingly crucial.
A comprehensive (but yet incomplete) appraisal of the technology problem
would treat the two following questions: Given the initial state of the econ-
omy, including its technological and skill states, is it optimal to switch to
another more productive but capital and skill specific technology? If the
decision is to adopt, what is the optimal timing of adoption? The first ques-
tion is the basic one, but the second is far from accessory. A too quick
and/or massive adoption would be a disaster, on one hand because the re-
turn to adoption, just like the return to innovation, is truly uncertain,2 and
on the other hand, because of the lack of complementarity between the new
technology and the actual structure of the economy (for example, the com-
position of skills in the economy, see Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). In the case
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of the technologies embodied in capital goods, the issue is even more crucial.
These technologies are associated with non-negligible obsolescence costs (see
Krusell, 1998, and Boucekkine, del Rı´o and Licandro, 2002). As the pace
of embodied technological progress accelerates, a large amount of vintage
capital goods will be out-graded and withdrawn from the productive sectors.
If upgrading technologies induces significant obsolescence costs, it is unclear
why the economy should upgrade. If additionally one takes into account the
learning costs inherent to adoption, the issue becomes even more challeng-
ing. Under which conditions would an economy switch to a more productive
technology knowing that switching involves obsolescence and learning costs?
What is the optimal timing of switching?
Some early contributions to the optimal adoption problem have stressed its
economic and technical complexity. In Parente (1994) and Galor and Moav
(2000), the adoption problem results from the depreciation of the pre-existing
specific human capital, and the need to learn the new technology. In Jo-
vanovic and Nyarko’s model, the learning process is Bayesian in nature and
as long as the economic agents do not estimate accurately some productivity
parameters, an output loss results. It is a partial equilibrium set-up, and
the considered Bayesian structure makes it difficult to think about a general
equilibrium extension. In contrast, Parente, and Galor and Moav consider
general equilibrium models. The latter use a discrete time two periods over-
lapping generations framework, and are able to analytically characterize the
dynamics of technology adoption. Parente uses a continuous time infinite
horizon representative agent setting, and is unable to provide such a char-
acterization. Indeed, the endogeneity of adoption timing in his framework
disables any analytical inspection into the dynamics of technology adoption
despite the linearity of the production function and other simplifying as-
sumptions. For such a purpose, only a computational approach works (see
an extension of Parente’s model in Iacompetta, 2001). Moreover and in con-
trast to Jovanovic and Nyarko’s setting, there is no possibility to stick to
a given technology, upgrading always occurs, which makes Parente’s model
unadapted when one has to handle technological sclerosis cases.
Our paper is a technical contribution to the literature of technology adop-
tion allowing to address the problems mentioned just above. We solve tech-
nology adoption optimization programs in continuous time. Technological
progress is assumed to be embodied in capital goods. In addition to even-
tual learning costs, our problem involves obsolescence costs. The economy
starts with a given technological menu, consisting of the levels of both em-
bodied and disembodied technological progress. As in Greenwood, Hercowitz
and Krusell (1997), the embodied technological progress variable does indeed
measure the productivity in the capital goods sector, while the disembodied
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or neutral technological progress variable amounts to factor productivity in
the consumption goods sector. However, in contrast to these authors, we con-
sider that the production technology in the latter sector is AK, ie. constant
returns to scale with respect to capital, so that long term growth is no longer
exogenous. We assume that another menu is available from the beginning
with a higher a level of embodied technical progress but with a lower level
of disembodied technological progress (to reflect the loss of expertise in the
new technology after switching). It is shown that a higher level of embodied
technical change is associated with a decrease in the relative price of capital,
which rises the user cost of capital by the so called obsolescence costs, a well
known property since Solow (1960). However, having a more efficient capital
sector is likely to trigger growth, and may offset the obsolescence costs. How
should the economy deal with this trade-off? Can we characterize an optimal
timing for adoption?
In this paper, we study various adoption problems within the framework
described just above. In line with the above mentioned literature on tech-
nology adoption, we also analyze the role of learning in this process. In
contrast to Parente (1994), we just allow for one switch (or a finite number
of switches, see Saglam, 2002). From the point of view of technology mon-
itoring policy, this is far from a shortcoming. In very sharp contrast to the
existing literature, we are able to derive analytical results using two stage
optimal control techniques (Tomiyama, 1985, Tomiyama and Rossana, 1989,
and Makris, 2001). The approach uses standard optimal control theory but
it is constructed as a dynamic programming method. We will show that
these techniques are extremely easy to implement and prove very efficient
when one is facing optimal adoption problems. Moreover, the economic in-
sight that one can gain from using the two stage optimal control framework
is also appreciable. For example, we will see later on that we can generate
the three possible decisions: immediate adoption, and sticking to the initial
technology as corner solutions, and delayed adoption (finite delay) as the
interior solution. Thus, the set-up can perfectly be used to finely investigate
the determinants of adoption delays.
In particular, we will study how learning can affect adoption delays by con-
sidering a rich learning curve. Learning involves some fixed costs but it may
be partly controllable by the economy. Indeed, the amount to be learnt may
depend on the timing of adoption for strategic reasons. For example, there
may be an incentive to wait in order to take advantage of the experience of
the first movers. There are many other foundations of strategic behavior in
such a context (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1998), all attempting to re-
produce the observed diffusion curves. We will introduce such an ingredient
in our model, and study how it interacts with the obsolescence costs and the
fixed learning costs induced by technology switching. The optimal adoption
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pace is then finely described in connection with the latter aspects.
To this end, we will structure the paper as follows. Section 2 will solve a
preliminary adoption problem with embodied technical change but without
learning curves. The problem will be solved both under a finite and infi-
nite optimization time horizon. We will make clear from the beginning of
this section how two stage optimal control works. Section three introduces
learning curves. Section 4 concludes.
2 The basic model
Consider an economy inhabited by a representative agent which intertempo-
ral utility function is ∫ T
0
u(C(t))e−ρtdt,
where u(.) is increasing and strictly concave. We shall consider first that
the optimization horizon, T , is finite in order to illustrate one of the funda-
mental properties of optimal adoption timing: Its extreme sensitivity to the
optimization horizon. ρ is the time discounting parameter. This parameter
will be also shown to be decisive in the adoption decision. The production
function in the consumption sector is simply AK, and the consumption good
is either used for consumption or as an input, I, in the production of the
capital goods:
Y = C + I = F (K) = AK,
where A > 0 is the marginal productivity of capital.3 The production func-
tion in the capital goods sector is, as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell
(1997):
K˙ = qI = q[AK − c],
assuming without any loss of generality that the capital depreciation rate is
nil. q measures the productivity in this sector, and as such, it represents the
embodied technical progress variable. Note that a rise in q will only affect the
new capital goods, in contrast to an increase in A, which is meant to have the
same effect on all capital goods whatever the date of the their production,
whatever their vintage.4 In this sense, A is neutral and q is investment
specific. We finally, assume that K(0) = K0 is given but K(T ) ≥ 0 is free.
Hereafter, we shall represent any technical menu by a pair of positive numbers
(A, q). We assume that the economy starts with a menu (A1, q1). However,
another menu (A2, q2) is available from t = 0 involving: q2 > q1 but A2 < A1.
Roughly speaking, the economy can switch to a second technical regime with
a more efficient capital goods sector but with a less efficient consumption
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goods sector. Implicit in the latter the assumption that the economy masters
the first technology but not the second, which implies say a lower expertise
in the use of the new capital goods associated with the second technology.
This assumption is completely in line with Parente (1994), and even more
with Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001). We will omit learning effects in this
benchmark case. Assume that at date t1 ∈ [0, T ], the economy does operate
the switch. Then, the production function of the capital goods (ie. the state
equation of the underlying optimal control problem) can be decomposed as
follows:
K˙ = q1[A1K − C], (1)
if 0 ≤ t < t1, and
K˙ = q2[A2K − C], (2)
if t1 < t ≤ T . t1 is the switching time. Given the trade-off described above,
what would the optimal switching time of an economy maximizing the wel-
fare of a representative agent subject to the state equation above? Under
which conditions the economy switches immediately (ie. at t = 0, delays
switching or sticks to the first technology forever? If the economy delays
switching, what are the determinants of this optimal delay? We will ad-
dress precisely these issues and we will undertake the task analytically using
two stage optimal control. The next section briefly describes the resolution
procedure.
2.1 The two stage optimal control technique
Summarizing the discussion just before, our optimal control problem is
max
C,t1
∫ T
0
u(C(t))e−ρtdt,
subject to (1) and (2), K0 given and K(T ) ≥ 0 free. Note that we can rewrite
our objective function as follows:
U(C, t1) =
∫ t1
0
u(C)e−ρtdt+
∫ T
t1
u(C)e−ρtdt. (3)
As the welfare performances of the two possible technological regimes are
additively separable, the use of two stage optimal control is most natural.
The approach is carefully described and theoretically founded in Tomiyama
(1985) and Tomiyama and Rossana (1989). An extension to infinite horizons
programs has been very recently provided by Makris (2001). As mentioned in
the introduction, the method proceeds by solving a sequence of conventional
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Pontryagin problems. In our case, the sequence contains two problems, which
corresponds to the number of possible technological regimes, but as it will be
clear in a moment, the method should work at least for any finite number of
problems (see Saglam, 2002). Applied to our model, the method works like
this:
1. The new technology problem step: Assume that the economy does switch
to the new technology at t1. Furthermore, assume also that initial capital
stock for the new technology K (t1) = K1 is given. For t1 and K1 given,
maximize U2 (K1, t1) =
∫ T
t1
u(C) e−ρtdt , subject to the state equation (2),
K˙ = q2[A2K − C], t1 < t ≤ T , with K(T ) free. Denote by λ2(t) and by
H2(K,C, t, λ2) = −u(C(t)) e−ρt + λ2 (q2A2K(t) − q2C(t)), respectively the
co-state variable and Hamiltonian associated with this Pontryagin problem.5
Assuming that a maximum exists, denote by U∗2 (K1, t1) and H
∗
2 (K1, t1), re-
spectively the optimal welfare performance of the new technology regime and
the optimal Hamiltonian value for t1 and K1 given.
2. The old technology problem step: Maximize U(C, t1) =
∫ t1
0
u(C) e−ρt dt+
U∗2 (K1, t1) , subject to the state equation (1), K˙ = q1[A1K − C], 0 ≤ t < t1,
K0 given and K1 = K(t1) free. This is done in two sub-steps:
2.1. Solve the problem for fixed K1 and t1, with λ1(t) and H1(K,C, t, λ1) =
−u(C(t)) e−ρt + λ1(q1A1K(t) − q1C(t)), respectively the corresponding co-
state variable and Hamiltonian. Denote by H∗1 (K1, t1) the resulting optimal
Hamiltonian value.
2.2. The matching conditions: Continuity and optimality. Find the optimal
values for K1 and t1. For interior optimal solutions, K
∗
1 and t
∗
1, to exist, the
following equations should hold:
λ1(t1) = −∂U
∗
2 (K1, t1)
∂K1
(4)
H∗1 (K1, t1) =
∂U∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
(5)
If U2(K1, t1) is twice continuously differentiable inK1 and t1, these conditions
become:
λ1(t
∗
1) = λ2(t
∗
1), (6)
H∗1 (K
∗
1 , t
∗
1) = H
∗
2 (K
∗
1 , t
∗
1). (7)
As one can easily see, equation (6) featuring the optimality of the K1’s choice
ensures the continuity of the co-state variable at t1. Equation (7) is the
optimality condition for an interior switching time to exist.
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3. Sufficient condition for maximum:
∂H∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
− ∂H
∗
1 (K1, t1)
∂t1
< 0.
4.Corner solutions. Assume that U2(K1, t1) is twice continuously differen-
tiable in K1 and t1, which turns out to be the case in all our applications.
Consider the case where the equations (6)-(7) have no solution in t1 such
that 0 < t1 < T . Two corner solutions are still possible.
(i) Immediate switching : t∗1 = 0 if H
∗
1 (K0, 0) ≥ H∗2 (K0, 0).
(ii) Technological sclerosis : The economy will never switch in the time in-
terval [0 T ] if and only if H∗1 (K
∗
1 , t
∗
1) < H
∗
2 (K
∗
1 , t
∗
1) for every t1 in [0 T [ and
H∗1 (K
∗(T ), T ) ≤ H∗2 (K∗(T ), T ).6
We shall apply this method to our basic model and give the details of the
corresponding computations in the next section. The algebraic details will
be omitted in further applications of the method.
2.2 Solving the model
We will follow closely the method described above starting by the solution
of the Pontryagin problem corresponding to the new technological regime.
We take the logarithmic utility case to ease the exposition, the method still
produces closed-form solutions for any other isoelastic utility function for ex-
ample. Concise economic interpretations will follow the technical exposition.
1. Our optimal control problem is:
max
C
U2(C, t1) =
∫ T
t1
ln(C(t))e−ρtdt (8)
subject to K˙ = q2A2K(t)− q2C(t), with K1 given and K(T ) ≥ 0 free. With
the corresponding Hamiltonian defined as: H2(K,C, t, λ2) = −u(C(t)) e−ρt+
λ2 (q2A2K(t)− q2C(t)), the first order necessary conditions are standard:
K˙∗ = [∂H2/∂λ2(K∗, λ∗2, C
∗, t)], (9)
λ˙∗2 = −[∂H2/∂K(K∗, λ∗2, C∗, t)], (10)
λ∗2(T ) ≤ 0 and K∗(T )λ∗2(T ) = 0 (11)
and with
min
C
H2(K
∗(t), λ∗2(t), C, t) = H2(K
∗(t), λ∗2(t), C
∗(t), t) a.e. on [t1, T ]
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Since C∗ clearly depends on the choice of t1 and K1 it is obvious that :
U∗2 = U
∗
2 (K1, t1). The (trivial) integration of these necessary conditions gives
us the following results7:
K(t) = e(q2A2)t[e−(q2A2)t1K1 +
q2a0
ρ
(e−ρt − e−ρt1)], (12)
C(t) = a0e
(q2A2−ρ)t, (13)
λ2(t) = − 1
q2a0
e−(q2A2)t. (14)
Given the terminal point condition (11), one may find that
a0 = −ρK1
q2
e−(q2A2)t1
(e−ρT − e−ρt1) (15)
And thus, at t1, we have
C(t1) =
ρK1
q2
e−ρt1
(e−ρt1 − e−ρT ) , (16)
λ2(t1) =
(e−ρT − eρt1)
ρK1
. (17)
This finally allows us to compute the optimal welfare performance of the new
technology regime in terms of t1 and K1.
U∗2 (K1, t1) =
∫ T
t1
ln
[
−ρK1
q2
e−ρt1e(q2A2−ρ)t
(e−ρT − e−ρt1)
]
e−ρtdt. (18)
Notice that U∗2 (K1, t1) is trivially twice differentiable with respect to both
K1 and t1. Accordingly one can check that the following relations hold:
∂U∗2 (K1, t1)
∂K1
= −λ2(t1),
∂U∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
≡ H∗2 (K1, t1).
2. Now we have to solve the following Pontryagin problem
max
{C, t1}
U1(C, t) =
∫ t1
0
ln(C(t))e−ρtdt+ U∗2 (K1, t1) (19)
subject to K˙ (t) = q1A1K(t) − q1 C(t), 0 ≤ t < t1, with K0 given and
K1 = K(t1) free. Assuming that t
∗
1 is an interior point in [0, T ] makes the
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constraint 0 ≤ t1 ≤ T inactive and we are left with an auxiliary problem for
the old technology with free end point and free terminal time.
2.1 For fixed t1 and K1, the Pontryagin maximum principles allow to write
straightforwardly the first order conditions as in step 1. Integrating them
gives:
K(t) = e(q1A1)t[K0 +
q1a0
ρ
(e−ρt − 1)], (20)
C(t) = a0e
(q1A1−ρ)t, (21)
λ1(t) = − 1
q1a0
e−(q1A1)t. (22)
2.2. In order to determine optimal K1 and t1, we use the continuity and
optimality conditions (6) and (7). By means of (6), we can find that :
a0 = −ρK1
q1
e−(q1A1)t1
(e−ρT − e−ρt1) . (23)
And thus, at t1, we have
C(t1) =
ρK1
q1
e−ρt1
(e−ρt1 − e−ρT ) , (24)
λ1(t1) =
(
e−ρT − e−ρt1)
ρK1
, (25)
K(t1) =
(eρ(T−t1) − 1)
(eρT − 1) e
(q1A1)t1K0. (26)
Now utilizing the optimality condition (7), we can determine the (interior)
optimal time of switching to the new technology as follows:
H∗2 (K1, t1)−H∗1 (K1, t1) = 0⇒
ln
[
q2
q1
]
e−ρt1 +
(
q2A2 − q1A1
ρ
)(
e−ρT − e−ρt1) = 0⇒
t∗1 = T +
1
ρ
ln
1− ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
(q2A2 − q1A1)
 .
It follows that there exists an interior solution such that 0 < t∗1 < T for a
given T > 0, if and only if
0 <
ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
(q2A2 − q1A1) < 1− e
−ρT .
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3. We will check the second order condition whether t∗1 leads to a maximum
or not. For t∗1 to be a welfare maximizing switching time, sufficient condition
is that, at t∗1,
∂H∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
− ∂H
∗
1 (K1, t1)
∂t1
< 0.
Therefore,
ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
(q2A2 − q1A1) > 1.
Note that this violates the condition under which an interior solution exists
such that 0 < t∗1 < T, for a given T > 0. The date t
∗
1 computed in step 3. is
not a maximizer.8
4. We finally investigate under which parametric conditions the corner so-
lutions arise. Since q2 > q1, the condition just above can be broken in two
ways.
(i) Technological sclerosis : If q2A2 − q1A1 ≤ 0, the interior solution does not
exist. Indeed under this condition, we have always H∗2 (K1, t1)−H∗1 (K1, t1) >
0 for every 0 ≤ t1 ≤ T as long as q2 > q1. This implies that there is no
incentive to switch in such a case. If q2A2 − q1A1 > 0 but
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(q2A2−q1A1) >
1 − e−ρT , we have still, H∗2 (K1, t1) − H∗1 (K1, t1) > 0 for every 0 ≤ t1 < T,
and H∗2 (KT , T )−H∗1 (KT , T ) ≥ 0 : Switching is not optimal neither.
(ii) Immediate switching : If t∗1 = 0 then H
∗
1 (0) ≥ H∗2 (0). Therefore,
ρ ln
[
q1
q2
]
+ (1− e−ρT ) (q2A2 − q1A1) ≥ 0,
or
1− e−ρT ≥
ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
(q2A2 − q1A1) .
It must be noted from the parametric conditions under which we obtain
corner solutions that switching to the new technology with a delay is always
dominated by either switching immediately or sticking to the old technology
alternatives.
2.3 Economic interpretation
We now concisely interpret the results above. We summarize them in the
following proposition.
11
Proposition 1. Assume q2 > q1 and A1 > A2.
(i) If q2A2 − q1A1 ≤ 0, the economy will not switch to the new technology.
(ii) If q2A2 − q1A1 > 0, then:
(v) either
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(1−e−ρT ) (q2A2−q1A1) < 1, and the economy immediately switches to
the new technology,
(vv) or
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(1−e−ρT ) (q2A2−q1A1) > 1, the economy sticks to the old technology,
(vvv) or
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(1−e−ρT ) (q2A2−q1A1) = 1, the economy is indifferent between switching
or sticking.
These results come from some specific outcomes of the embodiment assump-
tion. In order to understand them easily, note that from our computations
in the previous section, optimal consumption follows the path:
C(t) = α e(q1A1−ρ) (t−t1), (27)
if 0 ≤ t < t1, and
C(t) = β e(q2A2−ρ) (t−t1), (28)
for t1 < t ≤ T , with α and β two constants such that αβ = q2q1 . (27) is obtained
by combining (13),(15) and (16), and (28) is obtained by combining (21), (23)
and (24). Notice the two following characteristics of optimal consumption:
(P1): The consumption path is discontinuous at t = t1. Since q2 > q1, we
have α > β, meaning that the level of consumption along the old technology
regime is higher than in the new regime.
(P2): The growth rate of consumption is higher in the second regime if and
only if q2A2−q1A1 > 0, that is if the improvement in the efficiency of the new
capital goods is enough to compensate the loss in expertise (ie. A2 < A1)
due to the switch.
Let us interpret further property (P1). The acceleration in the rate of em-
bodied technological change is associated in our framework with a reduction
in the relative (shadow) price of capital. In other words, this acceleration
is accompanied by a rise in the (shadow) price of consumption goods with
respect to the (shadow) price of capital goods. This induces a re-assignment
of the resources of the economy towards the capital goods sector, resulting
in relatively less consumption and more capital accumulation. So the con-
sumption level should drop from the date of the switch. Since the utility
function is logarithmic here, the welfare cost of this drop is ρ ln( q2
q1
). The
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higher the impatience rate ρ, the bigger the welfare cost due to the drop in
the consumption level. We shall refer to this cost as the the obsolescence
costs inherent to embodiment as it derives from the decrease in the relative
(shadow) price of capital.
On the other hand, if the economy switches to the new regime and if the
resulting improvement in the efficiency of capital goods is enough to com-
pensate the loss in expertise, the economy will experience a higher growth
rate. The growth rate differential is q2A2 − q1A1 > 0. As the horizon is
finite, the growth rate advantage is exactly: (1− e−ρT ) (q2A2 − q1A1). As T
shrinks, this advantage gets smaller. The trade-off is clear and can be mea-
sured by the ratio cost to advantage of switching, Φ =
ρ ln(
q2
q1
)
(1−e−ρT ) (q2A2−q1A1) . If
Φ > 1, the economy has no incentive to switch (case (ii)-(vv) of Proposition
1): The obsolescence costs more than compensate the growth advantage from
switching. If in contrast Φ < 1, the economy should switch immediately as
the growth advantage is the dominating force in such a case.
Notice that in this benchmark model, delaying technology adoption is never
optimal, even when the obsolescence costs coming from switching are close
to the corresponding growth advantage (Φ slightly lower than 1). The ra-
tional behind this behavior is the following.9 Because of property (P1), a
technology switching implies a downward jump in the level of consumption.
Because the utility function is strictly concave, the planner tends to smooth
consumption, which means that she typically avoids consumption discontinu-
ities whenever possible. Consumption discontinuities may be optimal if the
planner is surprised or if there are some incentives to delay switching. Since
the planner has perfect foresight and no incentive to wait in our benchmark
model, consumption discontinuities are not allowed after t = 0. Therefore,
delaying adoption is never optimal in the benchmark case. In the next sec-
tion, we will amend the model in order to generate optimal adoption delays.
Before, we examine very briefly the infinite time horizon extension of the
benchmark.
2.4 Infinite Horizon Case
In this section, we study the infinite horizon extension of our benchmark
model, T = ∞. One may follow exactly the computation steps detailed in
our application to the benchmark model. This is not necessary if one has
in mind that the solution paths of the infinite horizon problems are likely
to be the limits of the solution paths obtained in the finite horizon case
when T tends to infinity. Indeed, the optimization horizon crucially enters
step 1 of the method, the so called new technology Pontryagin problem.
In particular, the terminal conditions (11) are very important: λ∗2(T ) ≤
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0 and K∗(T ) λ∗2(T ) = 0. Since the objective function of our problem is
strictly concave in the control variable and since it is discounted, the needed
transversality conditions are just the limits of the terminal conditions (11)
when T goes to infinity:
lim
t→∞
K∗(t) λ∗2(t) = 0,
with limt→∞ λ∗2(T ) ≤ 0. As one can check, this is the unique departure with
respect to the benchmark case, in steps 1 and 2.1. In particular, the optimal
consumption path follows a similar motion:
C(t) = α′ e(q1A1−ρ) (t−t1), (29)
if 0 ≤ t < t1, and
C(t) = β′ e(q2A2−ρ) (t−t1), (30)
for t1 < t, with α
′ and β′ two positive. Again, one can check that as in the
benchmark case, α
′
β′ =
q2
q1
. Again, we have property (P1): An acceleration
in embodied technical progress induces a drop in the consumption level.
How does the growth rate advantage of the new regime play now? Recall
that in the finite horizon case, this advantage is captured by the term (1 −
e−ρT ) (q2A2 − q1A1). In the infinite horizon case, this advantage is simply
q2A2 − q1A1. If q2A2 − q1A1 ≤ 0, then there is no incentive to switch. What
happens if q2A2− q1A1 > 0 ? Is there any way to generate interior switching
time? Our economic interpretations in the last paragraph of section 2.3
suggest a negative answer to this question. Either with a finite or an infinite
time horizon, consumption discontinuities are not optimal after t = 0 under
perfect foresight and strictly concave preferences. This diagnosis is confirmed
by the method. Indeed, following closely step 2.2 of the method, one ends
with the following expression for H∗2 (K1, t1)−H∗1 (K1, t1):
H∗2 (K1, t1)−H∗1 (K1, t1) = ln
[
q2
q1
]
e−ρt1 +
(
q2A2 − q1A1
ρ
)(−e−ρt1) .
For an interior solution to exist, we must have H∗2 (K1, t1)−H∗1 (K1, t1) = 0. A
quick look at the expression above is sufficient to see that the latter equation
(in t1) is degenerate. We then trivially identify the following cases.
Proposition 2. Assume q2 > q1 and A1 > A2.
(i) If q2A2 − q1A1 ≤ 0, the economy will not switch to the new technology.
(ii) If q2A2 − q1A1 > 0, then:
(w) or 1 >
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(q2A2−q1A1) , the economy switches immediately to the new techno-
logical regime,
(ww) or
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(q2A2−q1A1) > 1, the economy sticks to the old technology.
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Hence, independently of the optimization time horizon is infinite, only two
decisions might be optimal and both are corner solutions: Either immedi-
ate switching when the obsolescence costs are lower than the growth rate
advantage of switching (case (ii)-(w)of Proposition 2), or sticking to the old
technology in the reverse situation (case (ii)-(ww) of Proposition 2). We next
examine a much richer model including learning and incentives to wait.
3 Optimal technology switching with learn-
ing
We consider the following extension of the benchmark model. The optimiza-
tion horizon is infinite as in section 2.3 just above. The production function
is still AK but the productivity parameter is now time varying to allow for
learning effects, exactly as in Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001). Precisely we
write: Y (t) = A(t) K(t) with : A (t) = 1 if 0 ≤ t < t1 and:
A (t) = 1− A?e−θ(t−t1),
for t1 < t, with A
? = b e−κt1 + α0
(
q2
q1
)
, where θ, κ, b and α0 are positive
parameters. Contrary to the benchmark case, the loss in expertise following
a technology switch is not permanent. The economy is supposed to learn
more about the new technology time after time, and to asymptotically elim-
inate this expertise gap. The learning speed is measured by the parameter
θ. The amount to be learnt at the date of the switch is given by A?. Note
that this amount increases as the technological acceleration q2
q1
gets sharper.
Notice also that the learning costs are decreasing with respect to the switch-
ing time (since b and κ are positive): The later the switching date, the lower
the amount to be learnt.11
This specification is crucial in generating interior switching dates as we will
see later. In our framework, such a behavior is not possible if the amount to
be learnt is independent of the switching date. If the amount to be learnt is
increasing in this date (for example if b is positive and κ is negative), delaying
adoption is also sub-optimal since we have a further mechanism to add to
those identified in the benchmark case against waiting. Our modelling (both
b and κ positive) introduces an incentive to wait. It is consistent with the
typical network externalities or late mover advantage stories often invoked
to build up diffusion curves (again see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 2001, for
an excellent survey of the literature regarding this aspect). How do the
learning mechanism and the waiting incentives affect the solution to the
optimal adoption problem seen in section 2.3? What could be an optimal
adoption delay with these new specifications?
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Before solving this problem using two stage optimal control, a very important
observation should be made. The law of motion of capital writes as follows:
K˙ (t) = q1[K (t)− c (t)], (31)
if 0 ≤ t < t1, and
K˙ (t) = q2[
(
1− A?e−θ(t−t1))K (t)− c (t)], (32)
for t > t1. With respect to the law of motion of capital (1)-(2) in the
benchmark case, the switching date t1 does enter the expression of K˙ (t) for
t > t1. Naturally this should change the optimality condition with respect
to t1, and the steps 2.2 and 3 of the method, as derived from to Tomiyama
(1985), should be amended. This issue has been indeed tackled by Tomiyama
and Rossana (1989), and we will illustrate their approach hereafter.
3.1 Solving the model
1. The Pontryagin conditions corresponding to the new technology problem
are as before (9),(10) with the transversality conditions limt→∞ K∗(t) λ∗2(t) =
0 and limt→∞ λ∗2(T ) ≤ 0. The corresponding Hamiltonian is
H2(K, c, t, λ2) = − ln(C(t))e−ρt+λ2
(
q2
(
1− (be−κt1 + α0 q2
q1
)e−θ(t−t1)
)
K(t)− q2C(t)
)
.
Integrating the Pontryagin conditions, one finds after some trivial but heavy
algebra that:
K(t) = e
q2
 
t+
e−θ(t−t1)(bq1e−t1κ+q2α0)
q1θ
!(
q2a0
ρ
(
e−ρt − e−ρt1)+ e−q2t1+ be−t1κ+α0θ K1) ,
C(t) = a0e
(q2−ρ)t+ e
−θ(t−t1)q2(be−t1κq1+q2α0)
q1θ ,
λ2(t) = − 1
q2a0
e
−q2t− e
−θ(t−t1)q2(be−t1κq1+q2α0)
q1θ .
Finally the transversality conditions give:
a0 =
K1ρ
q2
e
(ρ−q2)t1− q2(be
−t1κq1+q2α0)
q1θ .
Now come the new things with respect to the benchmark case application.
Using the expressions above for optimal consumption, capital accumulation
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and the co-state variable, one can again express the optimal value of the
objective function as a function U2(K1, t1). It is then possible to check that:
∂U?2 (K1, t1)
∂K1
= −λ2(t1),
∂U?2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
≡ H∗2 (K1, λ∗2(t1), C∗(t1), t1)−
∞∫
t1
∂H∗2
∂t1
dt.
With respect to the benchmark case, a new term appears in the expression
of
∂U?2 (K1,t1)
∂t1
, namely
∞∫
t1
∂H∗2
∂t1
dt. This term captures the effects of a change in
the switching date on the Hamiltonian value, and so on the optimal welfare
performance of the second technology regime. It is present here because
the switching date value affects explicitly the pace of capital accumulation
through the learning costs. This new term will obviously appear again in the
matching conditions in step 2.2.
2.1. Since H1(K, c, t, λ1) = − ln(C(t))e−ρt + λ1q1(K(t) − C(t)), this step is
identical to step 2.1 in section 2.2. So equations (20), (21) and (22) still hold
with A1 = 1. In particular, we get:
C(t) = a0e
(q1−ρ)t,
a0 the integration constant.
2.2. The optimality condition of the problem with respect to K1 does not
change, equation (4) still applies. However, since t1 appears directly in the
accumulation law of capital along the second technological regime, a new
optimality condition arises with respect to t1:
∂U∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
= H∗1 (K1, t1) +
t1∫
0
∂H∗1
∂t1
dt. (33)
Using the results of step 1, one can check that this condition can be rewritten
as
H∗2 (K1, t
∗
1)−H∗1 (K1, t∗1) =
t∗1∫
0
(
∂H∗1
∂t1
)
dt+
∞∫
t∗1
(
∂H∗2
∂t1
)
dt, (34)
while, as in the benchmark case, equation (6), the optimality condition with
respect to K1 may be rewritten as a continuity requirement at t = t1 of the
co-state variable. From this continuity condition, λ1(t1) = λ2(t1) =
−e−ρt1
ρK1
,
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one can compute the integration constant a0 as: a0 =
ρK1
q1
e(ρ−q1)t1 , which
allows to derive the optimal paths of consumption, capital accumulation and
the co-state variable in terms of t1. In particular, K1 = K (t1) = K0e
(q1−ρ)t1 .
Substituting in the (interior) optimality condition with respect to t1, namely
in equation (34), one gets after some trivial but cumbersome algebraic oper-
ations that:
t∗1 = −
1
κ
ln
q1(θ + ρ)
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
− q22α0ρ
bq1q2(κ+ ρ)
 . (35)
One can easily check that optimal t∗1 ∈ (0,∞) if and only if
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
<
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
<
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
+
bq2(κ+ ρ)
(θ + ρ)
.
3. The sufficient condition for t∗1 ∈ (0,∞) to be welfare maximizing is:
∂H∗2 (K1, t1)
∂t1
− ∂H
∗
1 (K1, t1)
∂t1
<
∂
∂t1
 t1∫
0
(
∂H∗1
∂t1
)
dt+
∞∫
t∗1
(
∂H2
∂t1
)
dt

which can be recast as(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
<
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
+
bq2(κ+ ρ)
2e−κt1
ρ(θ + ρ)
.
It can be easily checked that at t∗1 ∈ (0,∞) , given by (35), the sufficient
condition reduces to(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
>
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
,
which is always satisfied.
4. The necessary conditions for the degenerate cases where either the optimal
switching appears immediately or never switching occurs can be found very
easily.
(i) Technological sclerosis : This case occurs if H∗1 (K1, t
∗
1) − H∗2 (K1, t∗1) ≤
t∗1∫
0
(
∂H∗1
∂t1
)
dt+
∞∫
t∗1
(
∂H∗2
∂t1
)
dt if t∗1 →∞. This happens if and only if the following
condition holds (
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
≤ q
2
2α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
.
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(ii) Immediate switching : The economy switches immediately if H∗1 (K1, t
∗
1)−
H∗2 (K1, t
∗
1) ≥
t∗1∫
0
(
∂H∗1
∂t1
)
dt +
∞∫
t∗1
(
∂H∗2
∂t1
)
dt when t∗1 = 0. The corresponding
parametric condition is(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
≥ q
2
2α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
+
bq2(κ+ ρ)
(θ + ρ)
.
3.2 Economic interpretations and comparative statics
Denote by ∆ = q2 − q1 − ρ ln
(
q2
q1
)
− q22α0ρ
q1(θ+ρ)
. The results of the previous
section can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume q2 > q1.
(i) If 0 < ∆ < bq2(κ+ρ)
(θ+ρ)
, then adoption is delayed, the optimal switching date
t?1 being given by (35).
(ii) If ∆ ≤ 0, the economy should stick to the old technology.
(iii) If ∆ ≥ bq2(κ+ρ)
(θ+ρ)
, the economy should switch immediately to the new
technology.
In order to improve the readability of our mathematical results and their
economic discussion, we state the optimization outcomes in the special case
where the amount to be learnt is constant, ie. b = 0.
Corollary 1. Under q2 > q1, if b = 0, then either technological sclerosis or
immediate switching occurs:(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
<
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
⇐⇒ technological sclerosis,(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
>
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
⇐⇒ immediate switching,(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
=
q22α0ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
⇐⇒ indifferent between switching and sticking.
As in the benchmark case, we have again to deal with the obsolescence costs
and growth advantages of adopting a new technology with a higher level of
embodied technological progress. Obsolescence costs are still measured by
ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
. Indeed, the optimal consumption path is given by:
C (t) =
ρK1
q1
e(q1−ρ)(t−t1), if 0 ≤ t < t1
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and
C (t) =
ρK1
q2
e
(q2−ρ)(t−t1)−α0q
2
2+q1q2be
−κt1
q1θ
(1−e−θ(t−t1)), if t1 < t.
Taking the one-sided limits of the consumption path at t1 is enough to see
that the obsolescence costs, at the basis of the drop in the level of con-
sumption, can be measured exactly as in the benchmark case by ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
.
The growth advantage of switching is now measured by q2 − q1 since both
regimes imply the same long term marginal productivity of capital, equal
to 1. Nonetheless, for this to hold, the economy should ”learn” once it
switches, and this is costly. Now recall the learning curve structure: A (t) =
1 − A?e−θ(t−t1), for t1 < t, with A? = b e−κt1 + α0
(
q2
q1
)
. The amount to be
learnt, A?, consists of two different terms. The first one related to b e−κt1 does
depend on the value of t1 and represents a kind of value option of waiting.
By choosing t1, the economy controls indeed this component of the learning
process. The second term related to α0
(
q2
q1
)
does not depend on t1 and cap-
tures the fixed learning costs. The economy has no control on this term:
It exclusively depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the two considered
technological menus, and, as such, this term is not ”manipulable” by the
potential adopters. The indicator ∆ constructed above is consequently the
growth advantage of switching net of the obsolescence costs and the fixed
switching costs. Obviously, if ∆ ≤ 0, the economy has no incentive to switch
(case (ii) of Proposition 3).
When ∆ > 0, the economy will switch. If ∆ is big enough to ”compensate”
the option of waiting, namely the term bq2(κ+ρ)
(θ+ρ)
, then there is no reason to
wait, and the economy will switch immediately (case (iii) of Proposition 3).
Otherwise, the economy will wait, and a strictly positive adoption delay will
arise (case (i) of Proposition 3). If the amount to be learnt is constant (Corol-
lary 1), the value option of waiting is nil, implying that an interior switching
time is never optimal. In such a case, the cost of switching technologies is
simply increased with respect to the benchmark model, learning costs add to
the obsolescence costs: There is no substantial departure from the benchmark
model, and the economy either ”sticks” or immediately switches.
What are the determinants of the optimal adoption delay if it arises? The
next proposition summarizes the results regarding this aspect.
Proposition 4. Assume that 0 < ∆ < bq2(κ+ρ)
(θ+ρ)
, so that switching is delayed,
t?1 given by equation (35). Then
∂t∗1
∂θ
< 0 and
∂t∗1
∂α0
> 0. In contrast, the sign
of
∂t∗1
∂ρ
is ambiguous. A sufficient condition for
∂t∗1
∂ρ
to be positive is ρ < 1−θ
2
.
The properties stated in the proposition come from the expressions of the
20
derivatives. Indeed:
∂t∗1
∂θ
= −1
κ
 q1
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
q1(θ + ρ)
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
− q22α0ρ
 < 0,
as both the denominator and the numerator inside the brackets are positive
(due to the condition of interior switching existence). This is far from sur-
prising. A higher value for θ means a faster learning process, which rises the
incentives to switch. On the other hand, one gets immediately
∂t∗1
∂α0
= −1
κ
 −q22ρ
q1(θ + ρ)
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
− q22α0ρ
 > 0.
α0 measures the sensitivity of the fixed learning costs to the magnitude of
the technological acceleration as captured by the ratio q2
q1
. Thus an increase
in α0 rises the learning fixed costs and discourages switching. In contrast,
the behavior of adoption timing with respect to time discounting is again
ambiguous. In effect:
∂t∗1
∂ρ
= −1
κ
q1
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
− q22α0ρ− q1(θ + ρ) ln
[
q2
q1
]
q1(θ + ρ)
(
q2 − q1 − ρ ln
[
q2
q1
])
− q22α0ρ
 .
The denominator inside the brackets is positive due to the condition ensuring
the existence of an interior switching date. The sign of the numerator is
ambiguous. A rise in ρ increases the obsolescence costs, ρ ln
[
q2
q1
]
, which
tends to delay adoption. However a more ”impatient” economy would also
accelerate adoption since the sooner the adoption, the sooner the economy
will start to learn and the quicker it will gain expertise on the new technology.
This aspect is captured by the term θ+ρ in (35) for example. Therefore, the
adoption delay is a very complex function of the impatience rate. A sufficient
condition for
∂t∗1
∂ρ
> 0 is that ρ < 1−θ
2
. If the learning speed is very low (that
is θ tends to zero), this condition is checked by far for reasonable values of
the impatience rate. In such a case, the obsolescence costs effects dominate
the learning incentive, and the adoption delay is increased.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have applied two stage optimal control techniques to solve
explicitly optimal adoption problems under embodiment. In contrast to
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most of the contributions in the field of technology adoption, our results are
analytical. We have first solved a benchmark model without learning behav-
ior. The main property of our model is the drop in the level of consumption
at the switching date, coming from the fall in the relative price of capital
(obsolescence). If the growth advantage deriving from switching to a new
economy with a higher degree of embodiment is bigger than the resulting
obsolescence costs, the economy switches immediately; otherwise, it sticks
to the initial technical menu. Delaying adoption, waiting is never optimal
in such a case. In a second step, we have introduced a learning process ac-
companying the switch to the new technology when it occurs. Along the
considered learning curves, the amount to be learnt is composed of involves
some fixed costs and incentives to wait as well. We have shown that the
adoption decision depends on the growth advantage of switching net of the
obsolescence costs and the learning fixed costs. The economy will switch if
and only if this indicator is positive. If it is big enough to ”compensate”
the option of waiting, then there is no reason to wait, and the economy will
switch immediately. Otherwise, the economy will wait, and a strictly positive
adoption delay will arise.
Further extensions may consider at least two directions. First, the learn-
ing process could be much more finely specified. Second, instead of solving
central planner problems, decentralized equilibria could be considered. In
such a case, firm heterogeneity should imply differences in adoption timing
across sectors and firms, giving rise to diffusion curves. Both issues are in
our research agenda.
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Notes
1The Lisbon European Union meeting two years ago has indeed stressed
the need to implement a rational pace of adoption of the information tech-
nologies in order to take advantage of all its opportunities.
2As an example, think about the massive implementation of Minitel, a
kind of ”local” Internet, in France in the 80s. The surge of Internet makes
this huge and too early investment completely useless.
3As a matter of fact, the production function is also linear in Parente
(1994).
4Indeed, it is not difficult to show that this two sector model is the reduced
form of the Solow vintage capital model (1960), as pointed out by Boucekkine,
del Rı´o and Licandro (in press).
5We take the same conventions as Tomiyama (1985).
6Since time is continuous, the corner solution t∗1 = T also features tech-
nological sclerosis.
7We omit the ∗ for ease of the notation
8It is indeed a minimizer.
9We warmly thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this crucial
aspect of the problem, which decisively helps us to identify and correct an
algebraic mistake in the first version of this paper, and to improve the eco-
nomic discussion of the results.
10In the equality case:
ρ ln
h
q2
q1
i
(q2A2−q1A1) = 1, the economy is indifferent between
switching and sticking. We abstract away from this case hereafter.
11The adopted additive form for the amount to be learnt is only for con-
venience, in order to ease the interpretation of the mathematical results.
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